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NOTES 
Redefining the "Cost of Suit" Under Section Four of the 
Clayton Act 
The general American rule is that litigants must bear their own 
litigation expenses.1 Section four of the Clayton Antitrust Act2 pro-
vides, however, that a plaintiff who prevails in a private antitrust 
action may recover treble damages together with "the cost of suit, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee."3 Until recently courts had 
uniformly interpreted the phrase "cost of suit" as allowing recovery 
only of those expenses traditionally referred to as "court costs"4 
1. The traditional American rule on expenses denies their recovery absent statutory au-
thorization. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970) (''While the gen-
eral American rule is that attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable as costs, both the 
courts and Congress have developed exceptions to this rule for situations in which overriding 
considerations indicate the need for such a recovery." (footnote omitted)). The rationale is one 
of encouraging lawsuits: 
In support of the American rule it has been argued that since litigation is at best uncertain 
one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit and that the 
poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the 
penalty for losing included the fees of their opponent's counsel. 
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967), quoted in F.D. 
Rich Co. v. United States ex rel Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. I 16, 129 (1974). The reason-
ing behind the rule is that forcing a losing litigant to bear the increased liability represented by 
his opponent's expenses would discourage plaintiffs from seeking to vindicate supportable 
claims, and encourage defendants to settle rather than defend supportable positions because of 
the increased liability represented by expenses. See, e.g., Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 
U.S. 227, 235 (1964). This rule stands in contrast to the modem English rule which requires 
expenses to follow the judgment. See Fleischmann Distilling, 386 U.S. at 717. But even that 
rule is, in origin, a statutory exception to the common law. See Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 
I, ch. 1. Some commentators have argued for wholesale abandonment of the American rule. 
See, e.g., Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. R.Ev. 75 
(1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 
15 MINN. L. REv. 619, 643 (1931). In the federal system, 28 U.S.C. § 1920 is the statutory 
provision which controls most awards of expenses (making them "costs" within the nomencla-
ture of note 4 infra). 
2. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) 
(1982)). 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). The section provides, in pertinent part: 
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in 
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to 
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and 
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
4. See note 22 infra. For the sake of clarity, this Note adheres to the following nomencla-
ture: "expenses" refers to all expenditures incurred in conducting a suit; "costs" refers to 
statutorily recoverable expenses only, see note 5 infra; costs will sometimes be referred to as 
"taxable costs"; "cost of suit" refers to the Clayton Act provision specifically. As an example, 
attorney's fees would be an expense but not part of costs unless explicitly made so by statute. 
This Note argues that "cost of suit" includes not only court costs normally recoverable and the 
attorneys' fees specified in the Clayton Act, but also additional expenses such as attorneys' 
1905 
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under the federal cost statute, 28 U.S.C. section 19205 by way of 
Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 In August, 
1982, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals abandoned this 
limitation in Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co.7 and held that 
"the word 'cost' in the Clayton Act embraces all the ordinary and 
reasonable expenses of litigation."8 The Copper Liquor court, in a 
brief and conclusory discussion, supported its holding by pointing 
out the anomaly that would result from awarding treble damages 
and attorneys' fees but not permitting recovery of the expenses inci-
dent to the litigation.9 The court also found the new rule to be "con-
sonant with congressional policy,"10 though it did not discuss what 
specific policies were involved or vindicated thereby. The court's de-
parture from precedent and the vagueness of its opinion call for a 
careful analysis to place the decision properly in the context of anti-
trust policy. 
This Note explores the possible interpretations of the "cost of 
suit" provision and the policies which it implicates. It concludes that 
the Copper Liquor interpretation best advances the goals of the anti-
airfares, meals, lodging, telephone and mail courier services. These expenses are normally 
billed separately from attorneys' hourly fees. See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 
684 F.2d 1087, 1098 (5th Cir. 1982). 
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982) provides: 
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following: 
(I) Fees of the clerk or marshal; 
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily 
obtained for use in the case; 
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; 
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; 
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; 
(6) Compensation of court appcinted experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, 
fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this 
title. 
A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upcn allowance, included in the judgment or 
decree. 
28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1982) lists allowable maximum docket fees and costs for briefs in the federal 
courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1828 (1982) provides for interpretation services for criminal cases and for 
civil cases where the United States is a plaintiff in federal court. 
Some items have been held recoverable as costs under§ 1920 in addition to those expressly 
listed. For example, maps, charts, films, photographs, models and drawings reasonably neces-
sary for use at trial; charges for taking of depcsitions reasonably necessary to the case; and 
transcripts of pre-trial proceedings which were reasonably needed for use at trial or on appeal. 
See Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 138 (1964). 
6. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(d) provides in pertinent part: 
Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or 
in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs . . • . 
Rule 54(d) is merely the mechanism through which§ 1920 is applied in the federal courts. It 
does not authorize recovery for items other than those for which § 1920 authorizes recovery. 
7. 684 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1982), rehg. en bane as to other issues, 701 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
8. 684 F.2d at 1100. 
9. 684 F.2d at 1100. 
10. 684 F.2d at 1100. 
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trust laws set forth by Congress and the courts. Part I examines the 
development of the present controversy among the circuits. Part II 
analyzes and refutes the arguments which have been set forth in sup-
port of the traditional rule. Part III explores the policy considera-
tions which underlie private treble damage actions and concludes 
that the Copper Liquor interpretation of the "cost of suit" provision 
serves them better than does the traditional rule. 
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "COST OF Sun" 
Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914 to supplement the 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.11 In the first judicial interpretation 
of the Act's "cost of suit" provision, the Second Circuit limited re-
covery to traditionally allowed court costs.12 Courts consistently ap-
plied the Second Circuit's narrow construction for nearly sixty years, 
until the Fifth Circuit rejected it in Copper Liquor. The circuits are 
now split between those adopting the traditional narrow construc-
tion 13 and those following the Fifth Circuit in abandoning the origi-
nal rule and broadening the scope of the provision to include all 
expenses of litigation.14 
A. The Straus Standard 
In Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,15 the Second Circuit 
confronted the problem of reconciling section seven of the Sherman 
Act16 and section four of the Clayton Act.17 The former provided 
for recovery of "costs of suit" whereas the latter did likewise for 
"cost of suit." The court found the difference in language insignifi-
cant and held that Congress did not mean either phrase to include 
the expenses of suit. 18 The court's conclusion rested on two prem-
11. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)). 
12. See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 297 F. 791, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1924); see also 
notes 15-21 infra and accompanying text. 
13. The traditional definition has been explicitly adopted by the Second, Sixth, Seventh 
and Ninth Circuits. It has been affirmed without comment in the First and Fourth Circuits. 
See cases cited at note 22 infra. 
14. The Eighth Circuit has followed the Fifth, and the Third Circuit has affirmed a 
broader definition without comment. See cases cited at note 29 infra. 
15. 297 F. 791 (2d Cir. 1924). 
16. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890), repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 
283, § 3, 69 Stat. 282, 283. 
17. Clayton Act§ 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 
731 (1914)). 
18. 297 F. at 807. No case has been found pre-dating Straus specifically interpreting the 
expense provision of either act. According to Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust E'!farce-
ment, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365, 366 (1970), there were only 261 reported antitrust cases between 
1890 and 1924. It is not unreasonable to assume that the issue simply was not litigated before 
Straus. Litigation at that time involved the delineation of the broad scope of antitrust law, not 
its details. 
It is not surprising that the Straus court presumed that the Sherman Act provision meant 
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ises: first, if Congress had intended the Clayton Act provision to 
mean anything different than that of the Sherman Act, it would have 
indicated the distinction clearly; second, if "expense of suit" was 
meant, Congress would not have needed to add the phrase "includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee" in both statutes since that fee would 
necessarily be a part of expenses.19 Based on this analysis, the court 
refused to allow a prevailing plaintiff to recover stenographic ex-
penses incident to the litigation as "costs."20 
Although the specific holding as to stenographic expenses is no 
longer valid because of statutory revision,21 the logic of the Straus 
court as to the meaning of "cost of suit" has endured.22 The most 
recent exposition of this view is in Illinois v. Sangamo Construction 
only costs. The word costs has "a well understood, fixed and technical meaning." 20 C.J.S. 
Costs§ 1, at 257 (1940). It refers to statutory costs, now codified in § 1920. However, "cost" 
and "costs" do not always mean the same thing; the word "cost" and the phrase "taxable 
costs" ("costs" within the nomenclature set out in note 4 supra) generally have quite different 
meanings. "'Cost' may be considered as synonymous with 'expense'." Hygienic Chem. Co. v, 
Provident Chem. Works, 176 F. 525, 528 (2d Cir. 1910) (emphasis added). 
19. 297 F. at 807. This is contrary to the most reasonable interpretation of "including." 
See generally notes 33-41 infra and accompanying text. 
20. 297 F. at 807. 
21. See note 5 supra. 
22. The Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Straus in Twentieth Century-Fox Film 
Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 223 (9th Cir. 1964). In addition to Straus, the court relied 
upon the decisions in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962), 
cert. dismissed sub nom. Wade v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 371 U.S. 801 (1962), and 
Brookside Theatre Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 11 F.R.D. 259, 265 (W.D. Mo. 
1951), mod!fied on other grounds, 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952). 
Except for Straus, these are weak precedents. The Eighth Circuit did not address the issue in 
Brookside Theatre and the Tenth Circuit assumed without discussion that rule 54(d) applied in 
llnion Carbide and relied on a nonantitrust case construing it. Brookside Theatre has since 
been effectively overruled. See note 29 infra. 
The Sixth Circuit also adopted the Straus interpretation in Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing 
Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (6th Cir. 1975). It drew support from Straus; Goldwy,r, Trans 
World Airlines v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 81 (2d Cir. 1971), revd. on other grounds sub nom. 
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); and 6 J. MOORE, W. 
TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE f 54.71(3], at 1385 (2d ed. 1983) 
(merely collecting cases previously cited in this Note while arguing the plausibility of the op-
posing position at 1385-86). 
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit approved of the Straus interpretation in Illinois v. San-
gamo Constr. Co., 657 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1981). See notes 23-27 infra and accompanying text. 
The First Circuit may be deemed to have adopted the Straus standard as well by its action 
in Farmington Dowel Prods. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1970). In that case the 
court affirmed in part and remanded in part the District Court's decision, 297 F. Supp. 924 (D. 
Me. 1969), without discussion of the issue of costs. The District Court adopted the Straus 
standard. 297 F. Supp. at 930. 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the issue specifically. However, it affirmed 
a decision of the Federal District Court in Maryland adopting the Straus interpretation with-
out further discussion of the costs issue. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 
287 F. Supp. 143, 162 (D. Md. 1968), qffd., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 
920 (1970). 
The Second Circuit has reaffirmed its adherence to the standard as recently as Berkey 
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 309 n.75 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Grumman 
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 533 F. Supp. 1385, 1390-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) ("("cost of suit"] does not 
include 'out-of-pocket' disbursements."). 
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Co., 23 in which the Seventh Circuit held section four of the Clayton 
Act to be coextensive with the definition of costs in 28 U.S.C. section 
1920.24 The court indicated that facial dissimilarities between the 
two would not justify a departure from the American rule that liti-
gants must bear their own expenses of litigation absent a clear ex-
pression of congressional intent to the contrary.25 The court also 
found unappealing the lack of unif ormity26 which would result if the 
definition of costs was expanded for antitrust plaintiffs but not for 
other litigants serving the public interest as private attorneys gen-
eral27 under other statutes. 
B. The Copper Liquor Standard 
As stated above, the "reasonable expense of litigation" standard 
for "cost of suit" was first set forth by the Fifth Circuit in the Copper 
Liquor case.28 The court urged that 
[D]espite these decisions [Straus, etc.] it is arguable that, as Professor 
Moore points out, "had Congress intended 'cost of suit' to include only 
taxable costs, it would have said so." The interpretation suggested by 
Professor Moore appears not only to be a logical reading of the statute, 
but also is consonant with congressional policy. Allowing a prevailing 
party treble damages and attorneys' fees but denying recovery for ex-
penses incident to litigation would be anomalous. Accordingly we 
hold that the word "cost" in the Clayton Act embraces all the ordinary 
and reasonable expenses of litigation.29 
23. 657 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1981). 
24. If Straus is correct, this conclusion logically follows. Once it is agreed that "cost" is the 
same as "costs" and that the latter means "statutory costs," the statute governing such costs 
obviously ought to control. 
25. 657 F.2d at 866. 
26. 657 F.2d at 866. 
27. The use of private attorneys general is one of the primary policies that the antitrust 
laws are meant to serve. See notes 77-88 i,!fra and accompanying text. 
28. 684 F.2d 1087, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1982), rehg. en bane as to other issues, 701 F.2d 542 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
29. 684 F.2d at 1100 (footnote omitted). Professor Moore's point, 6 J. MooRE, W. TAG-
GART & J. WICKER, supra note 22, ~ 54.71[3], at 1385-86 (2d ed. 1981), is the very argument 
some of the courts relying on Moore's citation of cases in support of the Straus standard ig-
nored. See note 22 supra. ''Taxable costs" as used here is the same as "costs" in the nomencla-
ture set out in note 4 supra. 
The court went on to hold that§ 1920 was the sole means of recovering the basic categories 
of costs listed therein. Any expenses in those categories not allowed by § 1920 may not be 
recovered as costs and must be borne by either the litigant or his attorney. The court then 
added the statement that "[t]he other expenditures not listed in§ 1920 reasonably incurred in 
connection with this litigation are recoverable as attorney's fees." 684 F.2d at 1101. In light of 
the express holding that "cost of suit" includes such expenses, this statement is at best ambigu-
ous and at worst simply wrong. When attorneys' fees are awarded in American courts, they 
are awarded on the basis of properly billable hours multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in 
the district of the litigation and, in the proper circumstances, increased to reward counsel for 
the special complexity, contingent nature or public importance of the case. There is no place 
in such a calculation for nontime charges. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 
245, 255-70 (N.D. Ill. 1979); see also Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator, 487 F.2d 161, 
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The Copper Liquor standard rests on three grounds. First, a lin-
guistic analysis of the statute suggests that if Congress had meant to 
include only normal statutory costs, it would have indicated its in-
tention clearly. Second, it is anomalous to provide the prevailing 
plaintiff with treble damages and attorneys' fees, both rare awards in 
American courts, yet deny him the other expenses of litigation. 
Third, a more liberal interpretation of "cost of suit" serves the un-
derlying policies Congress sought to abet with the antitrust remedies. 
II. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING STRAUS AND ITS PROGENY 
The courts adopting the statutory costs standard rely essentially 
on three grounds. First, they conclude from a linguistic analysis of 
section four of the Clayton Act that "cost" could not have meant 
"expenses"; otherwise it would have been unnecessary to add a pro-
vision for reasonable attorneys' fees. This textual analysis can be 
countered by that of Copper Liquor, which is the more supportable 
given the laws on cost in effect at the time the Clayton Act was 
adopted.30 Second, the courts seek uniformity in the treatment of 
costs awards to parties acting as private attorneys general. However, 
there is currently little uniformity, and the Copper Liquor exception 
to the American rule on litigation expenses is narrow enough to 
167-68 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded for recalculation of altorney's fees, 540 F.2d 102 
(3d Cir. 1964); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 81-86 (E.D. Pa. 1983). But see 
Henry v. Webermeirer, 738 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1984), in which the Seventh Circuit, somewhat 
anomalously considering its stoutly held position in Sangamo, held that attorneys' fees might 
include attorneys' out-of-pocket expenses. This anomaly may rest in the fact that the case 
interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, which the 
court apparently felt should be interpreted more broadly than section four of the Clayton Act. 
Otherwise, this decision presents excellent arguments in support of the Copper Liquor stan-
dard. 
The Eighth Circuit adopted the Copper Liquor standard in Alexander v. National Farmers 
Org., 696 F.2d 1210, 1212 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2108, 103 S. Ct. 2110 (1983). 
This case gave the first clear indication of what sort of additional expenses were included. In 
Alexander, the court permitted recovery for attorneys' airfares, meals, lodging, telephone and 
courier mail services. 696 F.2d at 1212. It should be noted that this ruling by the Eighth 
Circuit effectively overrules Brookside Theatre Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 
11 F.R.D. 259 (W.D. Mo. 1951), mod!fied on other grounds, 194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. 
denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952), on which later courts adopting the Straus standard partially relied. 
See note 22 supra. The Alexander court declined to specify whether the expenses should be 
treated as part of the "cost of suit" or as attorney's fees, perhaps reflecting the difficulty in 
deciphering the imprecise language of Copper Liquor. 
In Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. PEPI, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1175, 1178-79 (W.D. 
Pa. 1977), the court defined "cost of suit" as the expense of prosecuting the suit to a successful 
conclusion. Although the District Court provided no analysis or authority to support this 
characterization, the Third Circuit affirmed the decision without an opinion. 582 F.2d 1275 
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979). This gives some indication that the Third 
Circuit would accept the Copper Liquor standard. Compare Skehan v. Board of Trustees of 
Bloomsburg State College, SOI F. Supp. 1360, 1388 (M.D. Pa. 1980) ("If Congress had in-
tended [in 42 U.S.C. § 1988] to authorize the recovery of a plaintiffs personal expenses, it 
would have done so by language similar to that used in the Clayton Act."). 
30. See notes 33-45 iefra and accompanying text. 
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avoid harming the general rule.31 Third, they find it significant that 
Congress has been silent in the face of almost sixty years of consis-
tently narrow construction by the courts. There is, however, no sig-
nificant reason to presume that this silence should be interpreted as 
ratification. 32 
A. Straus 's Linguistic Analysis 
The conflict between the linguistic analyses utilized in developing 
the two standards is, on its face, seemingly irreconcilable. Both posi-
tions presume the conclusion desired and then assert that if Congress 
had intended something else, it would have said so.33 There are, 
however, several reasons to dispute the Straus version of the statute. 
Straus concludes that the provisions of the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts with regard to costs are synonymous.34 This is questionable not 
only because prior case law had attributed different meanings to the 
key terms in the two statutes, 35 but also because the phrasing of the 
Clayton Act provision supports the Copper Liquor standard. In ad-
dition, the Straus definition of both "costs" and "cost," if accepted, 
renders this portion of both acts redundant of other statutes and 
therefore meaningless. 
Strauss unsupported presumption that the Sherman and Clayton 
Act expense provisions were intended to mean the same thing ig-
nores the difference in language used by the two statutes.36 It is in-
deed remarkable that the Second Circuit would find this difference 
insignificant since, fourteen years before Straus, that court expressly 
held that "cost" and "costs" were not synonymous in Hygienic Chem-
ical Co. v. Provident Chemical Works.31 In fact, the court in Hygienic 
31. See notes 46-57 infra and accompanying text. 
32. See notes 58-62 i'!fra and accompanying text. 
33. Compare text at note 19 supra with text following note 29 supra. The conclusory nature 
of the arguments on this issue is indicated by the brevity with which they are treated. See, e.g., 
Straus, 297 F. at 806-07 (one paragraph); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 
F.2d 190, 223-24 (9th Cir. 1964) (four paragraphs); Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 
F.2d 1143, 1149 (6th Cir. 1975) (one paragraph); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
603 F.2d 263, 309 n.75 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (one paragraph in a 
footnote); Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 657 F.2d 855, 865-66 (7th Cir. 1981) (three 
paragraphs}; Copper Liquor, 684 F.2d at 1100-01 (three paragraphs); Alexander v. National 
Farmers Org., 696 F.2d 1210, 1212 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2108, 103 S. Ct. 2110 
(1983) (two paragraphs). A good deal of the space in each case is devoted to recapitulation of 
prior decisions. 
34. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text. 
35. See notes 37-38 infra and accompanying text. 
36. Straus relies on the absence of any distinction in the legislative history. 297 F. at 807. 
Drawing inferences from congressional silence is at best a risky proposition. See notes 58-62 
infra and accompanying text. It is especially so here since Congress created an explicit differ-
ence in language in the two statutes. 
37. 176 F. 525, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1910). 
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held that, under its facts, "cost" was synonymous with "expense."38 
Thus, prior to Straus, the Second Circuit espoused what is essentially 
the linguistic interpretation adopted in Copper Liquor. 
The Straus court indicated that its view as to the synonymous 
meaning of the Sherman and Clayton Act provisions follows neces-
sarily from the language used. The words at issue in the Clayton Act 
read "the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."39 The 
plain meaning of a phrase so constructed is that "cost of suit" must 
encompass something greater than attorneys' fees alone. Straus ar-
gues that it merely encompasses court costs and attorneys' fees.40 
However, court costs now provided by section 1920 "costs" do not 
include attorneys' fees,41 nor is the term "costs" interpreted to in-
clude attorneys' fees absent a specific statutory authorization.42 By 
using the word including, Congress indicated that the Clayton Act's 
"cost of suit" means more than "costs." If they had intended to limit 
reimbursement to "costs," the clear and proper expression would 
have been "costs of suit and a reasonable attorney's fee." Thus, 
there is no need to construe the Sherman and Clayton Act phrases as 
synonymous. 
Even if the two phrases are treated as synonymous, they should 
arguably be given the broad reading of Hygienic Chemica/43 rather 
than the narrow, traditional definition of "costs." The narrow con-
struction of "costs" would contravene the rule of statutory construc-
tion which requires that effect be given to all provisions of a statute 
to avoid redundancy.44 Accepting the two phrases as synonymous, 
the Clayton Act then worked no change on existing law. The mean-
ing to be given the phrase is that given at the time of the Sherman 
38. 176 F. at 528. Hygienic construed the terms as part of a private contract rather than a 
statute. This is not grounds, however, for a meaningful distinction, nor did the Straus court 
attempt to make one. The contract in Hygienic dealt with precisely the issue of allocation of 
court costs and expenses of litigation. It makes no sense for the identical terms to be inter-
preted one way in a private contract and a different way in public law. Such a distinction 
could result ultimately in separate legal lexicons for public and private documents, a result 
wholly at odds with the consistency and predictability the law seeks. 
39. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). 
40. 297 F. at 807. 
41. See note 5 supra. When both the Sherman and Clayton Acts were passed, court costs 
were governed by R.S. § 983, Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, § 3, 10 Stat. 161, 168, the forerunner 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1920. That provision likewise did not provide for recovery of attorneys' fees. 
42. See notes 47-57 infra and accompanying text. 
43. Hygienic Chem. Co. v. Provident Chem. Works, 176 F. 525, 528 (2d Cir. 1910). 
44. See Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882). Courts now tend to cite the 
principle more for inlrastatutory construction than in/e,statutory construction. See, e.g., Ja-
recld v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1961); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 
528, 538-39 (1955). In the inle,statutory situation the argument that a provision such as "costs 
of suit" was a mere reminder to the courts might have more force. But in the present context 
this view seems quite dubious. Courts uniformly awarded costs to the prevailing party. See 
text at note 45 infra. There was no need whatever for a reminder. To depict the provision as 
such is to assume that either Congress was partially obtuse or it considered the courts so. 
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Act, 1890. At that time Congress had in effect a law for the federal 
court system which awarded specific costs to the prevailing party in a 
litigation as a matter of course.45 Since they were automatically re-
coverable, there was no need for Congress, in the Sherman Act, to 
add the phrase "costs of suit" at all if what was meant thereby were 
the already recoverable costs. It is reasonable to conclude that some-
thing different was meant which must have been in excess of "costs." 
If "costs of suit" and "cost of suit" are not so interpreted the inclu-
sion of either phrase by Congress is rendered superfluous to the 
"costs" statute. 
Therefore, whether the Sherman and Clayton Acts are construed 
consistently or independently on this issue, the Straus court's inter-
pretation fails and the linguistic analysis provides no support for in-
terpreting "cost of suit" as "costs" only. 
B. The Unfformity Argument 
One of the reasons for retaining the Straus standard upon which 
the court in Sangamo 46 placed heavy reliance is the desirability of 
treating exceptions to the American rule as to expenses47 in a uni-
form manner, especially in instances where the parties seeking reim-
bursement act as private attorneys general.48 This argument is 
unconvincing for several reasons. 
First, such a rule suggests a rigid approach to the assessment of 
costs. This is strikingly inconsistent with the flexibility and discre-
tion traditionally afforded courts in this area. Section 1920 itself is 
not, by its wording, mandatory.49 Nor have the courts limited that 
section to its literal language in terms of precisely which expenses are 
recoverable under it.50 Moreover, despite the American rule and the 
limits of 28 U.S.C. section 1920, the courts have a recognized discre-
45. The Fee Bill of 1853, ch. 80, IO Stat. 161 (1853). This statute was the predecessor of 
current code sections such as 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1982). It provides: 
(t]hat, in lieu of the compensation now allowed by law to attorneys ... in the United 
States courts . . . the following and no other compensation shall be taxed and allowed. 
But this act shall not be construed to prohibit attorneys . . . from . . . receiving from their 
clients . . . such reasonable compensation for their services, in addition to taxable costs, as 
may be . . . agreed upon between the parties. 
(Emphasis added). This statute then enumerated a long list of such charges. The statute is 
plainly mandatory within its coverage and sharply distinguishes between "costs" and attor-
neys' fees. Even if the statute were not dispositive, the normal practice of the courts at the time 
was to award limited costs to the prevailing party. See generally Payne, Costs in Common Law 
Actions in the Federal Courts, 21 VA. L. REV. 397 (1935). 
46. Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 657 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1981). 
41. See note 1 supra. 
48. Sangamo, 651 F.2d at 866. The idea of plaintiff as a private attorney general is one of 
the key policies underlying the antitrust laws. See notes 77-88 infra and accompanying text. 
49. "A judge or clerk ... may tax as costs .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982) (emphasis 
added). 
50. See note 5 supra. 
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tion to award expenses including attorney's fees and more in some 
instances.51 Rigid uniformity defeats the policy of permitting such 
:flexibility, and it further hampers courts in their e.ff orts to interpret 
cost statutes in a manner consistent with different congressional 
objectives. 
The second reason that uniformity is an unpersuasive argument 
is that it is not at all clear that Congress intended different cost-shift-
ing statutes to be given the same interpretation. Congress certainly 
has not used the same language in all of these statutes. 52 Relatively 
SI. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970); see also Sprague v. Ticonic 
Banlc, 307 U.S. 161, 164-66 (1939); Buford v. Tobacco Growers' Coop., 42 F.2d 791, 792 (4th 
Cir. 1930); Gazan v. Vadoco Sales Corp., 67 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934). The Supreme 
Court has expressly held that a degree of discretion remains in the court to tax expenses be-
yond the explicit language of the statute. In Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 235 
(1964), the Court said: 
We do not read that rule (54(d)] as giving district judges umestrained discretion to tax 
costs to reimburse a winning litigant for every expense he has seen fit to incur in the 
conduct of his case. Items proposed by winning parties as costs should always be given 
careful scrutiny. Any other practice would be too great a movement in the direction of 
some systems of jurisprudence that are willing, if not indeed anxious, to allow litigation 
costs so high as to discourage litigants from bringing lawsuits no matter how meritorious 
they might in good faith believe their claim to be. Therefore, the discretion given district 
judges to tax costs should be sparingly exercised with reference to expenses not specifi-
cally allowed by statute. Such a restrained administration of the Rule is in harmony with 
our national policy of reducing insofar as possible the burdensome cost of litigation. 
The Sangamo court had applied Farmer to the issue of the award of expert witness fees, hold-
ing them strictly governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982) which sets fees for all witnesses, 657 
F.2d at 855, 864-65. The Sangamo court did not, however, give Farmer any consideration in 
its interpretation of "cost of suit." There are probably several reasons for this choice. First, 
Farmer is a breach of contract suit, not an antitrust suit. To extend its interpretation of rule 
54( d) to the latter is to presume that the limitations of rule 54( d) control in antitrust cases and 
to ignore entirely the dispute over the proper interpretation of "cost of suit." Since rule 54(d) 
merely applies 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982), such a presumption allows § 1920 to govern in anti-
trust cases. Second, the danger that Farmer is seeking to guard against - discouraging legiti-
mate litigation through fear of being mulcted in expenses - does not arise in an interpretation 
of § 4 of the Clayton Act. That section provides only for the recovery of "cost of suit" by a 
prevailing plaintiff. There is no possibility that a losing plaintiff would suffer from a more 
liberal interpretation since there is no basis on which the provision could be made reciprocal. 
Far from being a disincentive to litigating one's claims, this interpretation serves as a positive 
incentive to do so. Third, such an argument would presume that the court in an antitrust case 
is as narrowly constrained in terms of discretion as in other civil actions. This is by no means 
necessarily true. See notes 61-62 infra and accom,,anying text. 
52. See 1 U.S.C. § 210(F) (1982) (Practices of Stockyard Owners) and 7 U.S.C. § 499g(b) 
(1982) (concerning perishable agricultural commodities) ("a reasonable attorney's fee to be 
taxed and collected as part of the costs of the suit"); 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(l) (1982) (a debtor's 
attorney in bankruptcy proceedings may recover "reasonable compensation for actual neces-
sary services rendered."); IS U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1982) (concerning obligor's right to rescind 
certain credit transactions) and IS U.S.C. § 1989(a)(2) (tampering with automobile odometers) 
("the cost of the action together with [a reasonable attorney's] fee as determined by the court"); 
Education amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 718, 86 Stat. 369 (1972) (race discrimi-
nation in public schools) ("a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.") (repealed 1978); 29 
U.S.C. § 107(e) (1982) (injunctions in labor disputes) ("including all reasonable costs (together 
with a reasonable attorney's fee) ... "); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (maximum work hours) ("reason-
able attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action"); 33 U.S.C. § 928(a)(b) 
(1982) (This act, dealing with carriers that operate on navigable waters refusing to pay employ-
ees' claims for compensation, provides for recovery by a prevailing plaintiff of a reasonable 
attorney's fee and certain spec!fic expenses.); 33 U.S.C. § 136S(d) (1982) (providing standing to 
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few sections of the United States Code use the precise formulation 
found in section 4 of the Clayton Act.53 To insist on a uniform inter-
pretation for all of these formulations ( or even only those arising in 
private attorney general situations) is to presume that Congress used 
different constructions as a mere caprice.54 . This view seems inap-
propriate, at best. One extreme solution would be to interpret all 
cost-shifting statutes uniformly according to the Copper Liquor stan-
dard,55 but this view suffers from the same inflexibility and denial of 
discretion to Congress and the courts that is inherent in Sangamo's 
construction.56 The better view is to consider the award of expenses 
as a continuum with the American rule at one end and the Copper 
Liquor standard at the other.57 Other cost-shifting situations are lo-
any citizen to bring suit in connection with water pollution) and 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (1982) 
(providing for penalties for ocean dumping) ("costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney 
and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines that such award is appro-
priate"); 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1982) (remedies for patent infringement) ("The court in exceptional 
cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) 
(1982) (discrimination in public accommodations) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) (equal 
employment opportunities) ("a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ... "); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3612(c) (1982) (fair housing) ("Court costs and reasonable attorney fees in the case of a 
prevailing plaintiff: Provided, that the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not finan-
cially able to assume said attorney fees."); 42 U.S.C. § 491l(d) (providing standing to any 
citizen to bring suit with regard to noise pollution) ("costs of litigation (including reasonable 
attorney and expert witness fees)"); 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (railway labor) ("a reasonable attor-
ney's fee ... as a part of the costs of the suit"); 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1982) (carrier liability for 
damages) ("a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of 
recovery, which attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case"); 49 
U.S.C. § 11705(3) (1982) (rights and remedies of persons injured by carriers) ("a reasonable 
attorney's fee as a part of the damages .•.. The district court shall tax and collect that fee as 
a part of the costs of the action."). 
53. See 12 U.S.C. § 1975 (1982) (recovery for tying arrangements in banking); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15a, 15b(l), 15c(a)(2) (1982) (Clayton Act as amended); 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) (injunctive 
relief for antitrust violations); 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982) (antitrust violations resulting in dumping 
of foreign goods); 15 U.S.C. § 298(b), (c) (1982) (fraud with regard to import and export of 
precious metals); 15 U.S.C. § 4016(b)(l), (2) (1982) (business injury by exporters acting under 
a government issued Certificate of Review); 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (civil remedies against 
the use of funds obtained by racketeering activity in interstate commerce); 46 U.S.C. § 1227 
(1982) (antitrust in shipping). All may be generally categorized under the rubric of antitrust. 
The more usual formulation in other statutes awarding attorneys' fees, see note 42 supra, is 
"a reasonable attorneys' fee as part of the costs of the suit." 
54. Cf. notes 33-46 supra and accompanying text. 
55. Some courts have given indications of going this far when a statutory exception explic-
itly shifts costs. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have said that when a statute expressly 
authorizes cost-shifting (usually by a declaration that attorneys' fees are recoverable), the lim-
its of§ 1920 do not apply. See Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 
1983); Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 618, 623 (4th Cir. 1978). Dowdell, at 
least, relies in part on Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In 
that case the Court refused to find a power in the federal courts to set aside the "American 
rule" as to costs and fees without an expression of congressional intent when based only upon 
a court finding that a party was acting as a private attorney general. Since, however, the 
antitrust statutes express a congressional intent to induce plaintiffs to act as private attorneys 
general, Alyeska does not stand in the way of cost shifting in antitrust litigation. 
56. See notes 47-51 supra and accompanying text. 
57. The placement of the Copper Liquor standard at the one extreme is strongly reinforced 
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cated in between according to congressional intent and the policies 
they serve. 
Clearly, the uniformity argument in support of the Straus stan-
dard, although appealing at first blush, cannot withstand analysis. 
C. The Argument from Congressional Silence 
The sole remaining support for the Straus standard is fifty-eight 
years of congressional silence in the face of the interpretation placed 
upon "cost of suit" by Straus. Two reasons undermine reliance on 
such silence. First, it is not at all clear that Congress has ever consid-
ered the issue of what is meant by "cost of suit" since Straus was 
decided.58 Although Congress passed three major antitrust acts since 
the Clayton Act, none of these considered the "cost of suit" provi-
sion in any detail, if at all.59 This lack of consideration is not partic-
ularly surprising, since recovery of expenses is a relatively small part 
of the overall antitrust recovery scheme. The treble damage award 
together with the award of the reasonable attorney's fee constitute 
by clear congressional intent to discourage the conduct proscribed by the antitrust laws. This 
is most evident in the award of treble damages. See Part III infra. 
58. The Court is loath to rely on congressional silence in the absence of express considera• 
tion of the specific issue, e.g., by consideration of a bill or amendment. See Commissioner v. 
Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) ("Re-enactment - particularly without the 
slightest affirmative indication that Congress ever had the (decision in question] before it - is 
an unreliable indicium at best."); Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 140-41 
(1941) ("Only a few ... episodic utterances [by courts] furnish a tenuous basis for the excep-
tion which we are now asked explicitly to sanction. . . . It is indulging in the merest fiction to 
suggest that the doctrine . . . was so obviously and firmly a part of the texture of our law that 
Congress in effect enacted it through silence." The doctrine involved dealt with the powers of 
federal courts to enjoin state court proceedings.); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-21 
(1940) ("To explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is 
to venture into speculative unrealities."). Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 
2017, 2032-33 (1983) (congressional silence taken as acquiescence because Congress had an 
"acute awareness" of the issue); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 
(1983) ("In light of this well-established judicial interpretation, Congress' decision to leave 
§ l0(b) intact suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the § lO(b) action"); 
Merrill Lynch Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82 (1982) ("[I]t is abundantly clear that an 
implied cause of action . . . was part of the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress 
legislated in 1974. In that context, the fact that a comprehensive reexamination and significant 
amendment • . . left intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts had implied 
a cause of action is itself evidence that Congress affirmatively intended to preserve that rem-
edy."); Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones University v. United 
States, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. I, 8-10 (discussion of Bob Jones followed by authors' criticism of 
the Court's theory of congressional ratification through legislative inaction on the ground that 
such inaction is ambiguous). 
Even if Congress had been aware of an issue and remained silent, this would not prevent 
the Court from reconsidering the matter if it felt the issue had been wrongly decided. See 
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961). 
59. See Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 13-13c 
(1982)) (concerned with price discrimination); Act of July 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-137, 69 Stat. 
283 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-16) (the Clayton Act) (allowed the United States to recover for 
injuries to its business or property); Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Pub. L. 
No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified in various parts of title 15) (allowed, inter alia, recov-
ery of attorneys' fees in injunction cases, made changes in antitrust actions). 
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the major portion of the plaintiff's incentive to litigate.60 Since Con-
gress did not fundamentally reconsider either of these items at the 
time of these acts, there is no reason to expect that Congress would 
have reconsidered the "cost of suit" provisions. 
Second, Congress may not have considered revision of the stan-
dard to be a legislative responsibility. Congress grants the courts "an 
authority they have in no other branch of enacted law" in the field of 
antitrust,61 virtually the authority to create a common law of anti-
trust. The statutes have tended to be short and general leaving inter-
pretation to the courts.62 Considering this delegation, it is not 
surprising that Congress would leave adjustments of this relatively 
insignificant clause to the courts. Given the fact that the Supreme 
Court has never authoritatively interpreted the "cost of suit" clause, 
this argument seems especially persuasive. 
In sum, none of the arguments advanced in support of Straus 
compels acceptance of that standard. An examination of the policies 
served by the antitrust laws is helpful in choosing the correct inter-
pretation of the "cost of suit" provision of section four of the Clay-
ton Act. As will be argued in the following part, the Copper Liquor 
interpretation is most consistent with those policies. 
Ill. THE POLICIES BEHIND THE SECTION FOUR REMEDIES AND 
THE "COST OF SUIT" PROVISION 
The legislative histories of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 63 the 
60. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS 2572, 2588. The relative inconsequentiality of the expense portion of recovery 
could also explain Congress' treatment of "cost of suit" and attorneys' fees in the 1955 Act 
which awarded the United States actual damages and the "cost of suit" when suing for injury 
to its property and business. That act denied the United States treble damages on the theory 
that the government did not need such an incentive to enforce the laws. S. REP. No. 619, 84th 
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2330. The Senate Report did 
not even see fit to mention the denial of the attorney's fee to the government, evidently believ-
ing that this was relatively insignificant as an incentive compared to the treble damages. Since, 
as H.R. REP. No. 499, supra, points out, the attorney's fee is seen as the bulk of the expenses of 
litigation, it is not hard to conclude that "cost of suit" was never considered. This conclusion is 
especially persuasive when one considers that the government does not incur the expenses a 
normal plaintiff would. The government has attorneys available in all districts so travel and 
lodging expenses would necessarily be unreasonable. Furthermore, the government must pay 
the salaries of those attorneys whether or not it sues. 
61. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953). 
62. Congress has never stepped in to tell the courts that they have gone too far in allowing 
antitrust recoveries or remedies. In fact, the contrary is the case. In each of the three acts cited 
in note 59, supra, Congress expanded the antitrust remedies. The Clayton Act itself was a 
response to a perceived narrowing of the Sherman Act by the courts. 
63. Although neither the House nor the Senate reports accompanying the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts state a clear purpose for these remedies, see H.R. REP. No. 1707, 51st Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1890); S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1914), such purposes are expressed in the debates on the bills. See, e.g., 21 Cong. Rec. 
1767-68 (remarks of Sen. George); 2456 (Sen. Sherman); 2612 (Sen. Regan); 2615 (Sen. Coke); 
3147 (Sen. George) (1890); 51 Cong. Rec. 9073 {Rep. Webb); 9270 (Rep. Carlin); 16274-75 
1918 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1905 
cases, 64 and the commentators65 all indicate that treble damages and 
the other remedies provided in section four of the Clayton Act pro-
mote not only the policy of compensation66 for the injured party, but 
also the policy of deterring violations. Deterrence is enhanced in 
two ways. The treble damages and attorneys' fees remedies, of 
course, serve as an in terrorum device to discourage future unlawful 
conduct. In addition, these remedies enhance deterrence through 
more pervasive enforcement of the antitrust laws - a result of the 
added incentive for private attorneys general to bring suit against 
alleged violators. As the following discussion illustrates, the Copper 
Liquor "reasonable expense of litigation" interpretation of "cost of 
suit" serves these policies better than the "statutory costs" interpreta-
tion of Straus. 
A. Section Four Remedies as Punitive Measures 
Trebling damages serves, at least in part, as a punitive measure 
against the violator. 67 By forcing the violator to make good by a 
factor of three the actual injury done to the specific plaintiff, section 
four acts to deter one who has already violated the laws from doing 
(Rep. Webb); 16317-19 (Rep. Floyd); 15818-21 (Sen. Reed); 10042-46 (Sen. Norris) (1914). 
The purposes of the remedies are perhaps more clearly and authoritatively expressed in S. 
REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1955 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2328 in 
connection with an amendment to the Clayton Act. 
64. See, e.g., American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 
574-76 (1982) (treble damages serve to punish, to deter and to compensate); Texas Indus. Inc. 
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,639 (1981) (''The very idea of treble damages reveals 
an intent to punish past, and to deter future unlawful conduct .... "); Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (treble damage action to deter, to punish and to compensate); 
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485 (1977) (the treble damage 
provision is primarily a remedy though it also serves to penalize and deter); Hanover Shoe, 
Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968) (the purpose of treble damage 
actions would be frustrated by allowing violators to retain the fruits of their illegality); Perma 
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) ("[T]he purposes of 
the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present 
threat to deter anyone contemplating . . . violation of the antitrust laws."). 
65. See, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW,§ 331, at 149-50 (1978); K. 
ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 63-77 
(1976); Blair, Antitrust Penalties: J)eterrence and Compensation, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 57; Loev-
inger, Private Actions - Tlte Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (1958); 
Parker, Treble PamageActions-A Financial J)eterrent to Antitrust Violations?, 16 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 483 (1971); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble Pamage Actions- Po They Work?, 61 CALIF. L. 
REv. 1319 (1973). 
66. Plainly, to award a prevailing plaintiff all of his reasonable expenses of litigation as 
part of the "cost of suit" provides a fuller and more accurate compensation for the harm done 
him by the breach of the antitrust laws. The main benefit, however, of such increased and 
more accurate compensation is to leave the noncompensatory portions of the treble damage 
award untouched by such expenses and so preserve the deterrent effect of that portion of the 
award. For this reason the analysis here focuses exclusively on the deterrent policies behind 
the antitrust laws. 
61. See note 64 supra. The Tax Code also recognizes that at least two-thirds of the dam-
ages are punitive. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 427 (1955). 
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so again.68 Despite some provisions of the law which may be viewed 
as detracting from this goal of punishment, 69 the sheer magnitude of 
a treble damage award imposes a severe sanction on the violator and 
provides a strong incentive not to err again.70 
If the punitive nature of damages awarded ex post discourages 
further misconduct by the party so punished, the award of damages 
has a deterrent effect ex ante as well. This award serves as a sword 
of Damocles over the head of a would-be violator merely by threat-
ening liability for such damages. Although the use of damages in 
this way has been criticized as a policy,71 there seems little room to 
68. It could be argued that this portion of the treble damages is not as much a punishment 
as a way effectively to make up for the damages that will not have to be paid to injured parties 
who never brought suit. This argument presumes that only plaintiffs representing one-third of 
actual damages arising from the violation will ever succeed in recovering. As Judge Posner 
has pointed out, there is no evidence to support the validity of this or any particular multiple 
for this purpose. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 226-27 (1976). 
This fact, coupled with the fact that no court or legislative authority appears to rely on it, may 
justify disregarding the presumption that only a fraction of potential plaintiffs sue in favor of 
the presumption that the excess over actual damages is in fact a punitive measure for the 
specific violation tried by the instant plaintiff. The deterrent effect would, of course, become 
less as the number of parties who failed to sue or failed to prevail in a suit increased. The 
government has, therefore, attempted to encourage plaintiffs to sue. See notes 77-88 infra and 
accompanying text. 
69. The provisions of I.R.C. § 162(g) (Prentice-Hall 1984) are often cited as undercutting 
the deterrent effect of the treble damage award. This section allows corporate defendants to 
deduct as a business expense the full amount of an antitrust award or settlement unless there 
has been a criminal conviction for the violation involved prior to the award or settlement. See 
Parker, supra note 65, at 495-96; Wheeler, supra note 65, at 1322-23. 
The refusal of courts to allow recovery of interest on an antitrust award for the period 
between injury and judgment also detracts from the deterrent effect of the antitrust remedies. 
This allows the violator the free use of the money and thus gives him an incentive for delay. 
See Parker, supra note 65, at 487-92; Wheeler, supra note 65, at 1323. 
It is also possible that a jury, aware of the trebling provision, will reduce its award to 
balance the total damages awarded to the injury. See Note, Controlling Jury Damage Awards 
in Private Antitrust Suits, 81 MICH. L. REv. 693 (1983). 
However, the fact that there are flaws in carrying out the intent to deter through punish-
ment or that, in some situations, other policy considerations may outweigh that intent, does not 
detract from the basic goal. 
70. The award of multiple damages is rare in American law. Where it does occur, it is seen 
as punitive and exemplary in nature to discourage further misconduct. See 22 AM. JuR. 2o 
Damages§ 236 (1965). Attorney's fees awarded under a statute are viewed in the same light. 
11. See, e.g., Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652 
(1983); Note, Unestablished Businesses and Treble Damage Recovery Under Section Four ef the 
Clayton Act, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1076, 1083-84 (1982), and sources cited therein. The gist of the 
argument is that there is some level of damages that would be self-defeating to exceed because 
of the chilling effect on legitimate activities that would result. If the damages arising from an 
antitrust violation are too great, companies considering future business activity and calculating 
their possible costs will overreact to the risk of an adverse judgment by operating with exces-
sive caution. As a result they will forgo legitimate activities near the margin of antitrust law to 
reduce the risk of ruinous damages. That this may have been of some concern to Congress 
from the outset might be inferred from the fact that while they considered several damage 
multiples less than three in drafting the Sherman Act, they considered none greater. See K. 
ELZINGA & w. BREIT, supra note 65, at 64-66. 
The primary concern in recent literature, however, is not over-deterrence but making ex-
isting deterrence more effective. See note 72 infra. See also Note, Class Actions for Punitive 
Damages, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1787, 1794-95 n.46 (1983). 
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argue that it would not achieve the desired result in theory. The 
greater the amount a rational economic actor must pay as punish-
ment for a violation in absolute terms, even when discounted by the 
probability of being caught, the greater the probability that the actor 
will avoid the risk altogether.72 
The award of attorney's fees under the Clayton Act73 is plainly in 
line with the punitive nature of treble damages and their deterrent 
effect. Attorneys' fees are rarely awarded under American law and 
the fact that they are awarded under the Clayton Act is indicative of 
a special interest in preventing the behavior proscribed therein.74 
The Copper Liquor interpretation of "cost of suit" promotes the 
policy of negative deterrence that underlies the other section four 
remedies. In terms of both the ex post deterrence of proven violators 
and the ex ante deterrence of future violations, the larger the sum 
recoverable from a violator, the more averse he will be to risk being 
caught and sued. The award of attorneys' fees is one step in that 
direction. Adoption of the "reasonable expense of litigation" stan-
dard is a second. Not only will the violator have to reimburse treble 
the actual damages, he will also have to bear all the plaintiff's costs 
incurred in proving and assessing the liability. 
The most significant policy objection to the adoption of this stan-
dard is the possible chilling effect which a greater recovery might 
have on legitimate activity.75 This objection, however, is not persua-
sive. Even if overdeterrence does exist it is unlikely that the award 
of expenses of litigation is the culprit. While the expenses associated 
with a suit are large enough that reimbursement would encourage 
enforcement, they are small enough in comparison to the other costs 
of losing an antitrust suit that they will not interfere with legitimate 
activity. The major portion of the award will be the treble damages 
and attorneys' fees, both of which are already recoverable.76 More-
72. One of the major criticisms of present antitrust policy is that the deterrence is not 
brought home to the real decision makers in a business since the managers do not pay or suffer 
from the payment of the trebled damages in many situations (e.g., where they own no stock). 
As a result they are not subject to the risk aversion theory set out in the text. See, e.g., K. 
ELZINGA & W. BREIT, note 65 supra, at 126-29; Blair, note 65 supra, at 62-69. This observa-
tion, however, does not invalidate the idea of risk-aversion as a useful tool in deterring anti-
trust violations. It simply calls for a reform to make the deterrence more effective by affecting 
the decision makers directly. 
73. IS U.S.C. § IS (1982). 
74. Attorney's fees are almost never open to a court to award as a matter of discretion. 
They are considered a matter for express statutory authorization. See 20 C.J.S. Costs§ 218 
(1940); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs§ 12 (196S). See also note 52 supra. 
1S. See note 71 supra. 
16. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976), reprinted in 1916 U.S. CooE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS 2588. Moreover, a business calculating the risk of future conduct is un-
likely to include expenses of litigation in its calculation since these are substantially within its 
control through its power to settle. A business would normally look only at the treble damage 
award and the possible compensable injuries that might result from the conduct. 
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over, if a chilling effect exists, it is primarily derived from uncer-
tainty as to what conduct is and is not prohibited. The solution is to 
define better the conduct that is to be deterred. Retention of as 
strong a deterrent as possible for that conduct which is to be pro-
scribed is, in any event, desirable. Awarding plaintiffs their full, rea-
sonable expenses of litigation would help provide that deterrence. 
B. Section Four Remedies as a Plaint!ffs Incentive 
To Eeforce the Law 
Treble damages provide an incentive for businesses and individ-
uals to act as private attorneys general to enforce the antitrust laws.77 
This incentive operates in two ways. First and most significantly, 
recovering treble damages may produce something of a windfall to 
the plaintiff,78 which should spur him to act in defense of his rights. 
Second, treble damage recoveries make "the remedy meaningful by 
counterbalancing 'the difficulty of maintaining a private suit against 
a combination such as is described' in the Act."79 
The Supreme Court's devotion to the policy of promoting anti-
trust enforcement through the maintenance of plaintiffs incentives is 
unyielding. The Court has repeatedly interpreted the statute to pro-
vide the maximum incentive to sue even in the face of other conflict-
ing policies. For example, the Court has eschewed a "clean-hands" 
doctrine for plaintiffs in antitrust actions saying, "The plaintiff . . . 
may be no less morally reprehensible than the defendant, but the law 
encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of 
competition."80 It has set aside the usual rule of agency and held the 
principal liable for punitive damages arising from the acts of the 
77. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,262 (1972). The use of private attorneys 
general is a device to save the government the cost of enforcement. By permitting and induc-
ing private parties to bring actions for antitrust violations, the government gets fuller enforce-
ment without having to undertake all of the investigations and suits itself. 
78. Indeed, the treble damage award has been attacked on just that ground. See, e.g., 
Bernard, The Actions of the Antitrust Plaint!ff Law, Policy and a Modest Proposal, 16 DuQ. L. 
R.Ev. 307, 322-23 (1977-78) (the situation provides a perverse incentive to suffer the injury for a 
time in order to get the opportunity for a treble damage action); Report of the Antitrust Selec-
tion Committee on Legislation of the New York State Bar Association: Definition of Cases Ap-
propriate for Treble Damages, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 395 (1982) (urging only actual damages be 
awarded where the defendant could not reasonably have known it was violating the law). 
79. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977) (quoting 
Sen. Sherman at 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890)). The thrust of this argument is that the type of 
violation may be difficult to prove and complex to present and so will require more extensive 
preparation and will necessarily have a lower chance of success. Trebling damages helps to 
indemnify the plaintiff for that risk by increasing the expected recovery. Thus, even when the 
chance of recovery is discounted by the lower probability of success, it will serve to spur prose-
cution unless the probability of success is less than one third of what would otherwise be 
pursued. This acts as an incentive to both the plaintiff and his attorney if the latter is working, 
as is usual, on a percentage basis. 
80. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). See 
also Bernard, note 78 supra, at 314-24. 
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agent when it held a nonprofit organization liable for treble damages 
for injuries caused by a member even though the organization (the 
principal) had obtained no ill-gotten gains.81 The Court has also al-
lowed standing to a plaintiff who has passed the costs of the injury 
done to it on to its own customers. 82 
Clearly, the Copper Liquor standard for "cost of suit" would add 
to the potential incentive available to an injured plaintiff. A would-
be plaintiff would have even more reason to vindicate her claim 
against an antitrust violator under the Copper Liquor standard since 
her reasonable litigation expenses would in no way deplete her even-
tual recovery.83 In light of the various countervailing policies re-
jected by the Supreme Court in favor of the incentive to sue,84 this 
argument is especially strong. Only the rigid retention of the Ameri-
can rule on expenses serves as a counter-argument. But, this rule is 
already substantially undermined in antitrust suits by the award of 
attorneys' fees.85 To provide the fullest effect to the incentive, all 
provable, reasonable expenses should be awarded in addition to the 
treble damage incentive recovery. 
Of more concern is the idea of "counter-balancing the difficulty 
of maintaining suit." There are two possible interpretations of this 
phrase. The most likely is that the plaintiff must be provided with 
sufficient incentives to enforce the antitrust laws, as has been dis-
cussed above. 86 The second possibility is that a portion of the treble 
damages may have been intended to defray expenses of litigating. 
However, even if this were the case, 87 a strong argument may be 
81. American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs., Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 4S6 U.S. S56 (1982). 
82. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). The hold• 
ing in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), addresses a somewhat different issue. 
In that case the consumers to whom the injury had been passed were denied standing to sue 
though the firm which had passed the injury through to them retained its standing. This deci-
sion rested on countervailing considerations. Most important, no doubt, was the fear of open• 
ing the courts to a huge number of suits and squandering judicial resources. In addition, the 
Court emphasized the difficulty of proof as to how much was passed through to each customer. 
Finally, if the middleman recovers, he can pass the recovery through to his customers just as he 
did the injury. Thus, injury alone is insufficient to justify standing but it is vital that someone 
have standing in order to sue and so deter the activity. Deterrence is, therefore, of greater 
importance than compensation. 
83. It is interesting to note that this problem was recognized in Ott v. Speedwriting Pub-
lishing Co., S18 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 197S), which adopted the Straus rule. That court stated: 
"We do not believe that recovery of the costs allowable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 ... would be 
sufficient incentive for a plaintiff with a very small claim to bring an antitrust action after 
denial of class action status." S 18 F.2d at 1149. Evidently the Sixth Circuit was content to let 
the injuries of plaintiffs with small claims who are unable to obtain class certification go 
unremedied. 
84. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text. 
8S. See notes 47-S7 supra and accompanying text. 
86. See note 79 supra and accompanying text. 
87. The argument advanced in note 79 supra that the purpose is to make up for the lower 
probabilities of prevailing in a difficult cause of action is at least as plausible. Furthermore, if 
expenses are to be made up by part of the treble damages award, addition of the phrase "cost 
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made that under present circumstances expenses may not be fully or 
adequately covered. Of a treble damage award, one-third is for ac-
tual damages. Recovery of that amount provides no greater incen-
tive to the plaintiff than he would have had in the absence of the 
treble damage remedy. Furthermore, this portion of the recovery is 
taxable if the income it replaces was taxable. 88 Since there was no 
income tax at the time of passage of the Sherman or Clayton Acts, 
this bites into the recovery the enacting Congresses intended. Of the 
remaining two-thirds, half or more may go to the plaintiffs attorney 
depending on the fee arrangement.89 Further, the fee arrangement 
may not cover expenses of litigation. In that event, plaintiff then 
retains less than one-third of the total award as her added incentive. 
These factors go a long way to erode the incentive intended in the 
antitrust acts. The Straus interpretation of "cost of suit" contravenes 
congressional intent to leave the incentive portion of a recovery un-
scathed.90 The "reasonable expense of litigation" standard at least 
partially redresses this situation by increasing the total recovery from 
which these deductions may be made. 
CONCLUSION 
The Copper Liquor "reasonable expense of litigation" definition 
of "cost of suit" for antitrust recovery is preferable to the Straus 
standard. On the one hand, none of the arguments advanced on the 
part of the Straus rule withstand analysis. The linguistic analysis on 
behalf of the Straus rule is unsound both on the ground of congres-
sional intent and with reference to the very precedents of the Straus 
court itself. The uniformity argument can be accommodated with-
of suit" is redundant and leads to double recovery since these expenses would then be reim-
bursed both by the treble damage award and the "cost" provision. 
88. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
89. Most antitrust litigation is done on a contingency fee basis without regard to the "rea-
sonable attorney's fee" set by the court. See K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, supra note 65, at 74. 
Indeed, there is some indication that it is not unusual for the attorney to claim the whole of the 
court-awarded fees and a percentage of the full damage award, perhaps as high as 35%. Id. At 
least one court has indicated that the trial court should take a careful look at such fee arrange-
ments with regard to the governing professional responsibility rules. See Farmington Dowel 
Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 87-88 (1st Cir. 1970). But courts are not likely to 
do so unless the client complains - a major difficulty in the enforcement of all the profes-
sional standards. 
In theory, the deterrent created by treble damages is effective no matter who actually col-
lects the multiple damages. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977). However, in 
practice other considerations intervene. To be an effective incentive the damage award must 
accrue to the plaintiff since he is the only one who may bring the suit and thus make the 
deterrent functional. Moreover, to accept that the deterrence is effective and acceptable in the 
hands of the attorney raises extensive problems of solicitation on his part. The attorney may 
be spurred improperly to seek cases involving the treble damage award with the risks of unnec-
essary litigation, barratry and maintenance that such activity might involve. Cf. Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-8, DR 2-103 (1980). 
90. See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text. 
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out doing violence to its purposes. The argument from congressional 
silence is dubious because of its tenuous nature and because Con-
gress has not considered the issue in such a way as to make that 
silence compelling. 
On the other hand, an analysis of the policy goals the antitrust 
statutes seek to serve results in a clear preference for the Copper Li-
quor "reasonable expense" rule. Increasing the level of plaintiff's re-
covery increases the deterrent effect both on those who have violated 
the laws and on would-be violators by raising the price they must 
pay for their misconduct. It also increases the incentive for the 
plaintiff to enforce the antitrust laws by bringing suit. 
Thus, the Copper Liquor standard is the definition best designed 
to obtain the results the antitrust laws seek to fulfill. It ought not be 
precluded on the basis of the dubious reasoning of past decisions. 
